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In this paper, we investigate how bank mergers affect bank revenues and present empirical 
evidence that mergers among banks have a substantial and persistent negative impact on 
merging banks’ revenues. We refer to merger related negative effects on banks’ revenues as 
dissynergies and suggest that they are a result of organizational diseconomies, the loss of 
customers and the temporary distraction of management from day-to-day operations by 
effecting the merger. For our analyses we draw on a proprietary data set with detailed 
financials of all 457 regional savings banks in Germany, which have been involved in 212 
mergers between 1994 and 2006. We find that the negative impact of a merger on net 
operating revenues amounts to 3% of pro-forma consolidated banks’ operating profits and 
persists not only for the year of the merger but for up to four years post-merger. Only 
thereafter mergers exhibit a significantly superior performance compared to their respective 
pre-merger performance or the performance of their non-merging peers. The magnitude and 
persistence of merger related revenue dissynergies highlight their economic relevance.  
 
Previous research on post-merger performance mainly focuses on the effects from mergers on 
banks’ (cost) efficiency and profitability but fails to provide clear and consistent results. We 
are the first, to our knowledge, to examine the post-merger performance of banks’ net 
operating revenues and to empirically verify significant negative implications of mergers for 
banks’ net operating revenues. We propose that our finding of negative merger related effects 
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1.  Introduction 
Bank consolidation continues to be a key theme in the financial industry worldwide. Most 
developed economies have experienced a substantial decline in the number of banks over the 
last two decades. In Europe’s largest economy, Germany, for example, the number of banks 
has fallen by over 50% from 4,719 in 1990 to 2,300 by the end of 2006.3 This development 
has attracted numerous researchers to investigate the banks’ motives for engaging in mergers 
and  acquisitions  and  banks’  actual  post-merger  performance.  Research  on  post-merger 
performance  mainly  focuses  on  the  effects  from  mergers  on  banks’  (cost)  efficiency  and 
profitability but fails to provide consistent evidence for merger benefits. For the purpose of 
this study we choose net operating revenues as measure of operating performance and thereby 
define net operating revenues as the sum of net interest and net non-interest income before 
deduction of any operating expenses. This measure of post-merger operating performance is 
particularly  appropriate  because  it  immediately  captures  changes  in  top-line  performance 
while masking any changes to the combined bank’s cost structure. In previous research the 
impact of mergers on net operating revenues has not  yet attracted much attention. In our 
paper, we contribute to closing this gap and investigate to what extend net operating revenues 
are affected by banks’ mergers and acquisitions activities.4 
Conventional  wisdom  suggests  two  counteractive  merger  related  effects  on  net  operating 
revenues: On the one hand, merging banks may benefit from revenue synergies derived from 
cross-selling, raised lending limits, the transfer of best practices or economies of scope in 
funding  and  distribution.  On  the  other  hand,  increasing  organizational  complexity  and 
restructuring measures such as branch network consolidation may endanger the competitive 
advantage in relationship banking which small banks have compared to larger banks because 
of their customer proximity and their decentralized organizational setup (e.g. see Berger et al. 
(1998),  Stein  (2002)).  Furthermore,  increasing  organizational  complexity  may,  at  least 
temporarily,  complicate  senior  management’s  ability  to  effectively  manage  day-to-day 
operations. Mergers frequently also result in the loss of customers that can only be overcome 
by (costly) retention measures. Customers are more likely to switch banks following a merger 
because often mergers are accompanied by potential inconveniences for customers such as the 
                                                       
3   Source: Deutsche Bundesbank. 
4   Going forward, we do not distinguish between mergers and acquisitions because economically all transactions among 
German savings banks are mergers. Hence, the expressions “merger” and “M&A” are used interchangeably.   3 
uncertainty of future service levels, the reduction of the number of (local) branches5 and the 
requirement for customers to change their account details (i.e. account number and bank code) 
which,  hence,  leads  to  the  reduction  of  customers’  switching  costs.  Finally,  the  merger 
process  as  well  as  the  post-merger  integration  may  temporarily  distract  managers  from 
effectively managing the operating business causing business disruptions and reducing overall 
productivity. Collectively, we refer to these potential negative merger related effects on net 
operating revenues as dissynergies.6 
For our empirical analyses we draw on a unique proprietary data set made available by the 
German Savings Banks Association with detailed financials of all 457 German savings banks 
that remained active at the end of 2006 following 212 mergers among savings banks during 
the  period  from  1994  to  2006.  Using  this  panel  data  set  we  find  that  mergers  have  a 
significant negative impact on banks’ net operating revenues implying that merger related 
dissynergies outweigh any revenue synergies following the merger. Interestingly, negative 
merger related effects also affect bank profitability because mergers among German savings 
banks do not seem to produce sufficient cost synergies to offset any negative effects on net 
operating revenues. The negative effects on net operating revenues persist not only for the 
merger  and  post-merger  year  but  for  up  to  four  years  following  the  merger.  However, 
negative effects decline in magnitude over time indicating that at least some of the negative 
effects are temporary in nature. After four years following the merger we observe a positive 
impact from mergers on banks’ net operating revenues, suggesting that in the medium to 
long-run mergers are advantageous to participating banks. In terms of the economic relevance 
we find that merger related dissynergies, on average, amount to approximately EUR 3 million 
of revenues per year compared to average net operating revenues of EUR 109 million or an 
operating income of EUR 39 million before loan loss provisions and write-downs for merging 
banks  in  their  pre-merger  years.  The  magnitude  and  persistence  of  these  merger  related 
negative effects highlight their economic relevance. We further find evidence that banks with 
experience  in  mergers  are  able  to  partially  offset  these  negative  merger  related  effects. 
However,  dissynergies  from  M&A  cannot  be  completely  offset.  The  robustness  of  our 
findings is confirmed by the introduction of alternative measures of operating revenues, the 
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operating revenues remains. 
6   Analogously we refer to dissynergies also as negative merger related effects throughout the paper.   4 
analysis  of  different  sub-samples  as  well  as  the  application  of  different  econometric 
methodologies. 
With this paper, we contribute to the strand of post-merger performance literature. While the 
majority of existing research on banks’ post-merger performance focuses on (cost) efficiency 
and profitability we are the first, to our knowledge, to investigate the implications of mergers 
for banks’ net operating revenues.7 Based on our finding of negative merger related effects on 
net operating revenues we propose that previous research fails to find evidence for significant 
merger related efficiency and profitability gains for banks because any positive effects are 
offset  by  the  negative  merger  related  effects  we  find  (see  e.g.  Berger  et  al.  (1999)). 
Furthermore, we are among the first to consider learning effects from repeated involvement in 
M&A in post-merger performance studies for banks. 
The remaining paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a brief overview of the most 
relevant  literature  on  bank  M&A  and  post-merger  performance  in  particular.  Section  3 
discusses  the  different  factors  influencing  banks’  post-merger  top-line  performance, 
categorized into the sources for revenue synergies as well as revenue dissynergies. Section 4 
discusses our unique panel data set as well as empirical specifications of the model. Section 5 
summarizes  the  empirical  results  and  highlights  the  robustness  of  our  findings.  Finally, 
section 6 concludes. 
2.  Review of empirical literature on post-merger operating performance 
Most  operating  performance  studies  focus  on  the  post-merger  (cost)  efficiency  and 
profitability of merging banks compared either to their respective pre-merger performance or 
the performance of a control group of comparable non-merging firms. These studies vary 
significantly in terms of observation period, geographic focus, merger size and econometric 
methodology, but most of them fail to find evidence for significant merger related efficiency 
gains. 
In  his  extensive  review  of  performance  studies  Rhoades  (1994)  concludes  that  previous 
findings point to a lack of improvement in efficiency or profitability upon bank mergers and 
that those findings are robust within studies, across studies and over time. He suggests that 
                                                       
7   In previous research only Knapp et al. (2005) observe merger related effects on revenues and find that merging banks 
generate less non-interest revenues than their non-merging peers.   5 
banks involved in horizontal mergers – like those we investigate in our study – should most 
likely benefit from efficiency gains due to savings from closing overlapping branches and, as 
most other mergers, from combining back-office systems, IT infrastructure and administrative 
functions. However, no study proves that these in-market mergers are different from other 
mergers and, hence, that they yield efficiency gains. According to Berger et al. (1999) results 
for post-merger performance of banks  are mixed: While early studies that concentrate on 
scale, scope and product mix efficiencies find that there are no significant efficiencies to be 
gained and potentially even some scale efficiency losses to be suffered from mergers among 
large banks, more recent research from the 1990s finds evidence for substantial efficiency 
gains. Dynamic X-efficiency studies for the 1980s yield results similar to other early studies 
with on average very little or no X-efficiency enhancements following mergers. Based on 
their own review of previous literature Amel et al. (2004) also find that there is generally only 
limited evidence of benefits from economies of scope or managerial efficiency gains through 
M&A, and if so, benefits appear limited in magnitude. They argue that banks face difficulties 
in improving cost efficiency particularly in Europe due to rigid labor markets, not allowing 
for layoffs which are the main source for cost synergies in bank mergers. Moreover, they 
conclude  that  the  benefits  from  M&A  accrue  only  after  a  few  years  as  restructuring  and 
integration  measures  take  time  to  show  first  results.  In  the  first  years  restructuring  and 
integration associated costs might offset early gains. 
The few existing post-merger performance studies for mergers among German banks arrive 
mostly at similar results. For example, Lang and Welzel (1999) investigate the size and X-
efficiency effects of mergers on costs using a sample of German cooperative banks and find 
no  evidence  that  ex  ante  X-efficiency  advantages  translate  into  superior  performance 
following the merger, not even if banks merged five or eight years ago. Lang and Welzel 
(1999) also suggest that pre-merger X-efficiency advantages of acquiring firms do not seem to 
be the key motive for mergers among German cooperative banks. Similarly, Elsas (2004) 
proposes that a large number of mergers among savings or cooperative banks in Germany are 
also  a  way  of  preemptive  distress  resolution.  Using  the  German  Central  Bank’s  distress 
database Koetter et al. (2005) find that approximately 10% of bank mergers in the period 
1995-2001 were bailouts. In this context the authors also find that merging banks, whether 
distressed  or  non-distressed,  perform  worse  than  a  control  group,  suggesting  that  non-
distressed  mergers  may  also  be  motivated  by  the  desire  to  avoid  financial  distress  and 
regulatory  intervention  in  the  future.  Another  study  by  Koetter  (2005)  evaluates  merger   6 
success on the basis of cost efficiency and despite earlier results finds that about every second 
merger is a success. However, he highlights that this success is limited to a cost efficiency 
differential of one percentage point between merging and non-merging banks. In the most 
recent study Georgiev and Burghof (2007) apply a dataset of German savings banks similar to 
the one used in our study and propose that bank mergers are time-dependent. They show that 
mergers in the period 1993-1998 underperformed their non-merging peers in terms of both 
cost and profit efficiency, while mergers in the period 1999-2004 show sustainable efficiency 
improvements.  However,  they  do  not  provide  any  insights  on  why  the  post-merger 
performance differs in the two periods observed. 
Generally, results from post-merger performance seem to conflict with the motives publicly 
stated by banks, motives such as scale and scope economies as well as the improvement of 
management quality. This could indicate that organizational diseconomies (partially) offset 
any gains from scale or scope efficiencies. Accordingly, Berger et al. (1999) argue that gains 
can hardly be observed because they may be  offset by  counteractive  effects arising  from 
managerial difficulties due to increased organizational complexity, culture clashes and other 
integration problems – a case we make for merger related effects on net operating revenues.8 
Because most, if not all, studies reviewed by Rhoades (1994), Berger et al. (1999) or Amel et 
al. (2004) focus their research on banks’ post-merger profitability using measures such as 
return on equity or return on assets they provide no indication whether mergers actually fail to 
produce efficiency gains or whether improvements are achieved but at the same time offset by 
counteractive  effects.  Although  a  number  of  studies  also  investigate  banks’  operating 
expenses or cost efficiency they still provide only limited insights on why overall profitability 
does  not  benefit  from  mergers  (even  in  the  case  of  actual  enhancements  to  banks’  cost 
structures). For example, in a recent study Beccalli and Frantz (2007) find that mergers are 
associated with a pronounced enhancement in banks’ cost efficiency but simultaneously with 
a deterioration in profit efficiency, return on equity and cash flow. The authors conclude, but 
do not provide proof, that merger gains are passed on to customers rather than to banks’ 
shareholders. With this paper, we intend to shed more light on the merger related effects on 
                                                       
8   Amel et al. (2004) offer further valid reasons why previous literature fails to prove the benefits of M&A among banks: 
Firstly, past deals suffered from stricter regulation. Secondly, improvement of efficiency is difficult to measure due to the 
lack of clear-cut results of the effects of M&A. Thirdly, there is a significant time lack between the transaction and the 
actual  realization of  respective  benefits  which  are  not  covered by  studies  that  analyze  the  effects  only  in  the  years 
immediately  following  a  merger.  Finally,  M&A  may  not  be  driven  by  efficiency  motives  but  also  by  non-value 
maximizing motives such as managerial hubris.   7 
banks’ revenues and whether potentially negative merger related effects on banks’ revenues 
are responsible why previous studies fail to show efficiency and profitability gains from bank 
mergers. We are among the first to investigate the impact of bank mergers on merging banks’ 
net operating revenues. So far, only Knapp et al. (2005) consider merger related effects on 
revenues  and  find  that  merging  banks  generate  less  non-interest  income  than  their  non-
merging peers.9 They show that non-interest income measured as percentage of total assets 
declines  further  relative  to  the  industry  in  all  five  post-merger  years  observed.  We 
substantially extend the scope of investigating merger related effects on banks’ revenues by 
including  both  net  interest  and  net  non-interest  revenues,  the  former  accounting  for 
approximately 80% of total net operating revenues in the case of German savings banks. 
3.  Influencing factors on post-merger net operating revenues of banks 
Motivated by the failure of previous research to find evidence for gains from mergers among 
banks, we investigate the impact of mergers on banks’ net operating revenues. Thereby we 
suggest two counteractive merger related effects on banks’ net operating revenues, namely 
revenue synergies and revenue dissynergies. While revenue synergies describe merger related 
gains  made  available  through  the  transaction,  revenue  dissynergies  pose  potential  losses 
caused solely by the merger or the combination of two or more banks. 
Revenue synergies can be realized from a number of different sources: First, banks aim to 
increase  sales  volumes  by  cross-selling  the  products  of  one  bank  to  the  other  bank’s 
customers, and vice versa (Linder and Crane (1992)). Second, merging banks are able to 
enhance the diversification of their loan portfolios as well as to overcome regulatory lending 
limits, hence, allowing them to expand their lending activities in terms of both volumes and 
average loan amounts. Among practitioners overcoming limits to banks’ lending activities is 
often cited as a key motive for mergers especially among smaller regional banks. Third, banks 
may  benefit  from  a  strengthened  competitive  position  in  certain  product  categories  and 
regions. Fourth, the transfer of best practices especially in the area of sales and marketing 
helps banks to improve their customer targeting and product pricing strategies (Linder and 
                                                       
9   There is a strand of literature that focuses on the effects of bank mergers on deposit and loan prices which they explain 
with merger induced changes to the respective market’s competitive structure. Prager and Hannan (1998) and Focarelli 
and Panetta (2003) find that interest paid on deposits decrease in the aftermath of mergers due to increased market 
concentration. Results for loans are mixed. For a literature overview and detailed analyses for the German case see 
Fischer (2005).   8 
Crane (1992)). Fifth, access to new customer groups and new geographical markets allows 
banks to expand beyond existing markets. Furthermore, merging banks might also be able to 
reduce their funding costs by improved access to money markets as well as less external 
funding requirements through use of potential cash and deposit surpluses from the other bank 
(Linder and Crane (1992)). Changes in funding costs are reflected in interest expenses as part 
of net interest revenues and, hence, affect net operating revenues. 
Although the sources for revenue synergies hold true for mergers among regional banks in 
general they are not fully applicable in the case of German savings banks. For example, the 
potential for cross-selling is very limited because German savings banks all operate on the 
basis of the same business model and very similar product portfolios. Furthermore, the so-
called regional principle (“Regionalprinzip”) stipulates by law that each savings bank must 
not  conduct  business  outside  its  defined  business  area.10  Hence,  mergers  among  savings 
banks should have almost no effect on the local market concentration and the merging bank’s 
market position. Also, the transfer of best practices is already being facilitated in light of the 
cooperation among savings banks formally established by their mutual membership in the 
German  Savings  Banks  Association  and  respective  regional  savings  banks  associations. 
Finally, the regional principle also limits the further regional expansion beyond the borders of 
the  combined  business  district  of  merging  banks.  Continued  regional  expansion  is  only 
feasible  by  ways  of  further  mergers.  Koetter  (2005)  suggests  that  the  regional  principle 
imposed for by German regulation also limits the potential for diversification benefits due to 
continued regional concentration and exposure to local economic conditions. 
In  terms  of  revenue  dissynergies  we  regard  the  following  as  circumstances  that  may 
negatively  affect  banks’  net  operating  revenues  in  the  post-merger  period:  First,  merger 
activity  comprising  mainly  of  the  transaction  execution  and  subsequent  integration  may 
(temporarily)  distract  managers  from  effectively  managing  bank’s  day-to-day  operations, 
which would adversely affect banks’ productivity and, hence, sales performance. Berger et al. 
(1999)  also  suggest  downsizing  and  culture  clashes  as  potential  triggers  for  business 
disruptions and, thus, reasons for inferior operating performance. According to Pilloff (1996) 
the effort required for merging two institutions may be costly and difficult to the extent that 
                                                       
10  The objective of the regional principle is to ensure that also rural and economically weak areas in Germany are supplied 
with financial services (see Koetter (2005)). The regional principle applies to savings and cooperative banks in Germany 
but not to private sector institutions.   9 
any  benefits  to  consolidation  may  even  be  lost.  Second,  with  increasing  size  and 
organizational complexity management’s abilities to monitor the bank’s business may also 
become less effective. Caves (1989) uses the term “managerial transaction costs” for this 
phenomenon and highlights that this possible source of inefficiencies from mergers has not 
been documented in the research literature. Third, as banks grow they are less able to reap the 
benefits of relationship banking, which is typically regarded as a strength of small banks. 
Especially in the course of mergers and acquisitions, banks’ growth is often accompanied by 
streamlining of branch networks eliminating regional proximity to customers and therefore 
the basis for relationship banking. Berger et al. (2005) and Bloch and Vins (2008) explain 
how bank size (and respective changes to bank size through M&A) determines the bank’s 
ability to conduct relationship banking and, hence, the bank’s lending and funding activities, 
respectively. Fourth, as Linder and Crane (1992) propose, merging banks tend to lose assets 
and deposits to competing banks. Customers are more likely to switch banks following a 
merger because often mergers are accompanied by potential inconveniences for customers 
such  as  the  uncertainty  of  future  service  levels,  the  reduction  of  the  number  of  (local) 
branches  and  the  requirement  for  customers  to  change  their  account  details.  The  loss  of 
customers would primarily affect revenues while costs would remain fairly constant, at least 
in the short-term. There is a wide literature, mainly in the areas of marketing and industrial 
economics  that  explores  the  impact  of  switching  cost  on  bank-customer  relationships.11 
Generally,  a  customer  only  switches  providers  if  the  expected  benefit  (e.g.  lower  service 
charges, higher deposit interest) from switching banks is higher than the switching cost. In the 
case of mergers associated inconveniences can pose substantial costs for the customer that 
may at least partially offset the benefits from the existing bank-customer relationship. 
The extent to which synergies are realized (or dissynergies are avoided) also depends on the 
experience the merging banks have in executing transactions and integrating new businesses. 
DeLong and DeYoung (2007) suggest that banks learn to better plan and execute mergers by 
repeatedly  participating  in  transactions  as  well  as  by  observing  the  successes  and 
shortcomings of other mergers. DeYoung (1997) confirms that acquiring banks with recent 
experience in M&A are more likely to produce post-merger cost efficiency gains. Contrarily, 
DeLong and DeYoung (2007) do not find empirical evidence for effects from learning-by-
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doing  but,  interestingly,  find  that  merging  banks  rather  learn  by  observing  other  recent 
mergers. 
4.  Empirical specifications 
Description of data set 
Our analyses are based on a proprietary data sample provided by the German Savings Banks 
Association comprising detailed financials of German public savings banks for the period 
from 1994 until 2006. At the end of 2006 there were 457 savings banks in Germany for all of 
which annual records for each year of the observation period are included in the sample. For 
each bank and year we have added data on the regional economic environment as well as the 
local market concentration. The data set is unique because it includes all savings banks active 
in Germany. In comparison, BvD’s BankScope only covers approximately 80% of the savings 
banks  in  terms  of  total  assets  and  number.  Also,  contrary  to  general  accounting  practice 
balance sheet data in our data set is based on arithmetic averages of monthly balance sheets. 
This poses a more realistic picture of the actual balances of the different asset and liability 
accounts throughout the respective year. Furthermore, our sample contains operating statistics 
such as the number of employees and branches per bank as well as a complete list of mergers 
and acquisitions among savings banks all of which are not publicly available. 
For several reasons savings banks in Germany pose a very interesting subject for economic 
research. First, besides the cooperative banks savings banks have been responsible for the 
majority of mergers and acquisitions among banks in Germany, accounting for 212 mergers 
between 1994 and 2006 while reducing the number of savings banks from more than 700 at 
the beginning of 1994 to less than 460 at the end of 2006 (see Panel A in Table 3). Second, 
together with cooperative banks savings banks are still the dominant provider of credit and 
banking  services  to  individuals  and  small  and  medium  sized  enterprises  in  Germany, 
accounting  for  approximately  40%  of  assets  in  the  banking  system.  Third,  savings  banks 
follow what is known as the "regional principle", i.e. each institution exclusively serves a well 
defined  and  separated  regional  business  area  that  often  corresponds  to  one  of  the  440 
administrative  districts  in  Germany.  This  allows  us  to  account  for  the  local  rather  than 
national  market  concentration  and  economic  environment.  Moreover,  due  to  the  regional 
principle consolidation among savings banks does not induce changes in market power and 
subsequently operating performance of non-merging banks. This is argued to be one of the   11 
problems of studies using sample groups of merging and non-merging banks operating in the 
same region (see Amel et al. (2004)). Fourth, all banks operate based on the same business 
model and an almost identical product offering. Fifth, all banks use the same accounting and 
reporting principles and almost all operate on the basis of the same legal foundation. Finally, 
all savings banks are independent institutions with their own business strategy and operational 
setup. As a result, these banks form a large group of highly comparable but independent 
entities – an ideal setup to analyze the implications of mergers as well as different bank and 
market characteristics with econometric models. 
The data set contains all German savings banks that were active at the end of 2006. Financials 
are  available  on  a  pro  forma  adjusted  basis  that  accounts  for  mergers  and  acquisitions. 
Thereby financials of acquiring and acquired banks have been consolidated over the whole 
observation  period  as  if  the  merging  banks  have  always  operated  as  one  entity.  Hence, 
contrary  to  general  accounting  practice  financials  have  not  only  been  consolidated  in  the 
period following a merger but also in the years prior to the actual transaction.12 Berger and 
Humphrey (1992), Linder and Crane (1992), Rhoades (1993) and Elsas (2004) use a similar 
approach in their respective post-merger operating performance studies. 
The list of mergers and acquisitions among savings banks comprises details on timing and 
parties involved for each transaction. The data set contains 212 mergers in the period from 
1994 to 2006 for which financials for an average post-merger time of 6.7 years are available. 
Economic data was provided by the German Statistical State Offices. Information on market 
concentration is based on regional bank branch statistics provided by the German Central 
Bank. The economic data and the concentration measures are reported on the level of the 
respective  administrative  districts  (“Landkreise”  and  “kreisfreie  Städte”)  the  bank  is 
headquartered  in.  Germany  comprises  of  440  such  administrative  districts.  Thomson 
Financial’s Datastream is used to obtain interest rate data. 
Descriptive  statistics  of  the  data  applied  in  our  empirical  analysis  are  provided  below 
following the introduction of the empirical model and variables. 
                                                       
12  Elsas (2004) points out that the approach of consolidation of balance sheet data by backwards aggregation dilutes merger 
related effects in case of subsequent mergers because financials of banks absorbed by subsequent mergers are included in 
consolidated financials already at the time of the first merger. In line with Elsas (2004) we argue that this problem is only 
relevant  for  a  small  sub-sample  of  our data;  in  our  sample  only  34  banks  are  repeatedly  involved  in  mergers.  Our 
robustness tests show that results remain unaffected even when excluding banks repeatedly involved in M&A.   12 
Empirical model and variables 
In this paper, we investigate whether banks’ involvement in mergers and acquisitions has an 
impact on their net operating revenues. 
The general form of the models we propose is as follows: 
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The dependent variable is net operating revenues (NOR, i.e. net interest and net non-interest 
revenues  before  deduction  of  any  operating  expenses)  for  which  we  use  three  different 
measures.13 First, we measure net operating revenues as the (logarithm of) absolute operating 
revenues (Ln(Net Operating Revenues)) in order to evaluate whether the level of revenues is 
affected by merges. Second, we include Net Operating Revenues per Employee as dependent 
variable to investigate whether potential merger related changes are a result of layoffs or 
changes to employees’ productivity.14 Third, we measure Net Operating Revenues as % of 
Total Assets to observe revenues in relation to overall bank size and, hence, to account for 
potential restructuring measures such as downsizing or disposals. Furthermore, the use of 
different  measures  for  net  operating  revenues  as  our  dependent  variable  verifies  the 
robustness of our findings. 
The key right hand side variables include dummy variables indicating when the respective 
bank was involved in a merger (M&A activity) as well as interaction terms that account for 
whether banks possess expertise in M&A from involvement in earlier transactions at the time 
of the respective current transaction (M&A activity · M&A expertise). In our empirical model 
we include several additional variables to control for bank specific characteristics (BS), local 
market  concentration  (LMC)  and  the  local  economic  environment  (LE)  of  each  bank. 
Furthermore, using fixed effects regression models we implicitly control for time-invariant 
fixed effects for each bank in the sample (a). As suggested by Wooldridge (2002a) we also 
                                                       
13  In further tests we also apply the same model setup to different measures of operating income as dependent variable. 
Furthermore, in robustness checks we re-design this model as dynamic model by including lags of the dependent variable 
on the right hand side of the equation. Because we arrive at consistent results we do not further report details on the 
model setup for conciseness reasons. 
14  We use absolute net operating revenues per employee instead of its natural logarithm because this variable is already 
scaled by the number of employees to reflect different sizes across banks. However, in a robustness check we also include 
the natural logarithm of net operating revenues per employee and arrive at consistent results.   13 
include  dummy  variables  for  each  year  in  the  observation  period  to  account  for  secular 
changes  that  are  not  being  modeled  (u).  The  constant  term  is  represented  by  c.  Table  1 
provides an overview of variables included as well as their respective calculation. Below we 
discuss the rationale for the inclusion of selected variables in more detail. 
In order to investigate the impact on net operating revenues from M&A activity we introduce 
a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the respective bank is involved in a merger or an 
acquisition in the respective year (M&A activity; t = t).15 The longer term impact of M&A is 
accounted for by the inclusion of lagged M&A activity dummy variables, one for each of the 
last four years (t = t - 1; t = t - 2; t = t - 3; t = t - 4) and one for M&A involvement in any 
year before that (t < t - 4) (for example, see Berger et al. (1998), Focarelli et al. (2002) and 
Elsas (2004)). For our analyses we choose a comparatively long explicit observation period as 
previous literature finds that merger benefits only emerge fully after some time (see Amel et 
al.  (2004)  for  an  overview).  The  reference  group  of  observations  for  our  M&A  dummy 
variable comprises implicitly all observations of banks that have not been involved in M&A 
throughout the observation period and observations of pre-merger years of merging banks. 
The control group does not include any observations of banks that have been involved in 
M&A in any previous year of the observation period. This is in line with Calomiris (1999) 
who suggests that the inclusion of observations of post-merger years into the control group 
limits the time horizon of gains and can lead to substantial underestimation of the gains from 
mergers.16 We also introduce a M&A expertise dummy variable that takes the value 1 in all 
years following the first M&A transaction of the respective bank (M&A expertise).17 In our 
model  we  capture  the  effects  from  banks’  experience  in  executing  mergers  through  the 
inclusion of an interaction term (M&A expertise · M&A activity). Coefficient estimates for 
this interaction term are interpreted as the average effect on net operating revenues for those 
merging banks that exhibit M&A experience from previous involvement in M&A. 
                                                       
15  Multiple transactions in any one year or single transactions with multiple parties involved are treated as one transaction 
since annual data is used for post-merger performance evaluation (see Linder and Crane (1992)). 
16  Also see Calomiris (1999) for a detailed discussion of the construction of counterfactuals in post-merger performance 
analyses. 
17  Our M&A expertise measure does not account for more frequent M&A activity because in our sample only 8 banks have 
been involved in more than two transactions during the observation period. Furthermore, due to the limited number of 
banks  frequently  involved  in  M&A  we  also  do  not  account  for  the  time  passed  between  the  first  and  subsequent 
transactions. Furthermore, one weakness remains that we cannot account for expertise gained in mergers before 1994 due 
to data constraints. Technically, in our analysis banks are only able to gain transaction experience from 1994 onwards.   14 
In order to account for further determinants of net operating revenues we control for bank 
specific characteristics. We include bank size (Ln(Total Assets)) to control for size specific 
effects such as economies of scale. Focarelli et al. (2002) also include bank size to control for 
size effects and to account for size specific cost and revenue structures. However, they do not 
include any other bank specific control variables. We account for the bank’s cost structure 
(Operating Expenses / Total Assets) as suggested by Rhoades (1994) to control for changes in 
product mix that would convert interest expenses into non-interest expenses without changing 
the overall bank’s efficiency. For example, in the context of post-merger cost efficiency gains 
he argues that banks lose out on relatively cheap deposits upon branch closures designed to 
cut non-interest expenses but at the same time they are required to replace lost deposits with 
more expensive money market funding, the latter of which is reflected in interest expenses 
and  may  offset  savings  in  non-interest  expenses.18  The  revenue  share  from  non-interest 
bearing products (Non-Interest Revenues / Operating Revenues), the loan portfolio share of 
corporate loans (Corporate Loans / Total Loans to Non-banks) and the extent to which the 
bank pursues lending business (Loans / Total Assets) are included to control for the bank’s 
business focus and product mix as well as the credit risk inherent in the bank’s business. The 
equity ratio (Equity / Total Assets) is used to account for the capitalization of the respective 
bank which we use as proxy of the risk aversion of the bank’s management. We propose that 
the equity ratio increases with management’s risk aversion.  In terms of its impact on net 
operating revenues we assume that risk averse management teams do not take on as many 
risky projects (e.g. loans) as risk-seeking management teams would do, hence, they generate 
comparatively less (non-risk adjusted) revenues. 
In line with Berger et al. (1999) we consider market concentration on a local bank market 
level (Local HHI) given that markets for most retail products are local.19 We control for 
market power but do not assume major shifts in local market concentration from mergers in 
our sample as German savings banks by law operate in proprietary, non-overlapping local 
markets. As data for total assets, loan and deposit volumes is not available on a regional level 
for all (especially private) banking groups, we determine the local market concentration as the 
                                                       
18  However, at the same time Rhoades (1994) acknowledges that changes in product mix do not necessarily occur upon 
mergers and that most banks plan branch closures to minimize deposit losses. Hence, we expect product mix effects to be 
limited. 
19  US studies focus on local bank  markets  analogous to US policy guidelines  for  merger  approval processes and also 
because research finds that both households and small businesses almost always choose banks that are present nearby (see 
Kwast et al. (1997) and Kwast (1999)).   15 
Hirschman-Herfindahl-Index on the basis of individual banks’ market shares calculated as the 
number  of  own  branches  in  each  administrative  district  over  the  total  number  of  bank 
branches in the respective district (see Fischer and Hempell (2006)). We assume that revenues 
increase  with  market  concentration  because  savings  banks  in  Germany  hold  a  dominant 
market  position  in  higher  concentrated,  typically  rural,  local  bank  markets.  In  rural  areas 
savings banks and cooperative banks are often the only banks present while private banks 
maintain branch networks merely in urban or more densely populated areas. 
In terms of macroeconomic factors we control for the average interest rate level (Interest 
Rate) and the bank’s ability to benefit from term transformation (i.e. funding long-term loans 
with short-term deposits while maximizing the average interest spread) approximated by the 
slope of the  yield curve (Yield Curve Slope). Factors that describe the regional economic 
environment are only used for robustness checks due to their high correlation with either bank 
size or local market concentration. 
Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive  statistics  are  structured  as  follows:  Table  2  presents  the  development  of  the 
overall  savings  banks  sector  in  Germany  as  well  as  individual  bank  and  local  market 
characteristics overall and on a per year basis. Table 3 provides an overview of the merger 
activity among German savings banks during the period from 1994 to 2006. 
Panel A of Table 2 outlines the development of the overall savings banks sector as well as of 
the average savings bank. During the observation period from 1994 to 2006 the total number 
of savings banks, the number of employees as well as the number of bank branches has 
declined substantially while the size of the German savings banks sector measured in total 
assets has increased by almost 25% to EUR 925 billion in 2006.20 On average, banks have 
grown by almost 2% per annum while net operating revenues have stagnated over the same 
period. Revenues did not grow in line with overall bank assets because of the ongoing margin 
erosion in German banking driven by intensifying competition. Moreover, the flat yield curve 
in recent  years has limited banks’ ability to benefit from term transformation. The strong 
growth in operating revenues per employee was driven by the reduction of employees rather 
than  by  growth  in  revenues.  The  reduction  in  personnel  accelerated  only  after  the  stock 
                                                       
20  Absolute values in EUR are presented at 2000 prices in order to account for inflationary effects.   16 
market downturn in 2002 representing the drive for efficiency enhancements among German 
banks. Generally, savings banks’ cost base measured as Operating Expenses / Total Assets 
decreased over the years from 2.2% in 1994 to 1.9% in 2006. Another important development 
is the increasing share of non-interest revenues as part of total operating revenues from 15% 
in 1994 to 22% in 2006. Both, a relatively flat interest rate yield curve reducing net interest 
revenues as well as the increased importance of non-interest bearing products are responsible 
for this development. Panel B of Table 2 presents means as well as 25% and 75% percentiles 
for observations of all banks for the years 1999 to 2006.21  
Table  3  depicts  the  M&A  activity  among  German  savings  banks.  Panel  A  describes  the 
decline in the number of savings banks in Germany which can be fully attributed to M&A 
activity. The number of savings banks dissolved through M&A is not equal to the M&A 
activity among savings banks because some M&A transactions involve more than two savings 
banks, also some savings banks were involved in more than one transaction in any one year 
which we do not account for in our analysis. Almost one third of mergers took place in 1994 
and  1995  and  was  conducted  mainly  among  East  German  savings  banks  because  of 
adjustments to the border lines of administrative districts in East German states following the 
German unification (see Georgiev and Burghof (2007)). A larger number of savings banks 
dissolved also in the years 2001 to 2003. Panel B presents a break down of how many savings 
banks have been involved in M&A once or repeatedly. Out of a total of 457 savings banks 
300 banks have not been involved in M&A during the observation period, 123 banks have 
been involved once while 34 banks have been involved two or more times. The savings bank 
in Dresden and her predecessors have been most active in M&A and have been involved in 
M&A in six years of the observation period. 
5.  Empirical results and discussion 
In  this  section  we  investigate  how  bank  mergers  affect  merging  banks’  net  operating 
revenues.  In  a  first  step,  we  compare  the  differences  in  means  of  net  operating  revenues 
between merging and non-merging banks in the years following the merger. In a second step, 
we estimate merger related effects on net operating revenues using the fixed effects regression 
                                                       
21  Please note that descriptive statistics in Panel B of Table 2 are based on observations for the years 1999 to 2006. This is in 
analogy to our main regression analysis which only accounts for observations in these years because up to five years of 
observations are dropped because of the inclusion of the dummy variables that account for banks’ merger involvement in 
at least the last five years.   17 
model laid out above. Moreover, we extend our regression analysis and analyze the effects of 
M&A expertise from merging banks’ repeated involvement in transactions on net operating 
revenues. We discuss our results based on analyses using different measures of net operating 
revenues  as  dependent  variables,  different  sub-samples  of  our  dataset  and  also  estimate 
merger  related  effects  on  net  operating  revenues  in  a  dynamic  model  to  confirm  the 
robustness of our findings. 
Impact of mergers on banks’ net operating revenues 
As part of our analysis of differences in means we compare the average development of net 
operating revenues of merging banks in the merger year and up to four years thereafter to the 
simultaneous average performance of the 300 savings banks not involved in M&A during the 
observation period. For our analysis of average post-merger performance we use an index 
with the pre-merger year as base year in order to ensure equal weighting of effects at banks of 
different sizes. Moreover, we use a t-test to show whether both merging and non-merging 
banks perform significantly different from each other. Table 4 depicts the performance of net 
operating revenues. The development of net operating revenues measured in absolute terms 
suggests  that  revenues  at  merging  banks  grow  slightly  slower  compared  to  non-merging 
banks. Nevertheless, performance differences are only statistically significant in the merger 
year and the first two post-merger years. In the years thereafter merging banks still exhibit an 
inferior  performance,  however,  results  are  not  statistically  significant,  i.e.  performance 
differences are not significantly different from zero. Based on net operating revenues per 
employee and net operating revenues as percentage of total assets merging banks perform 
slightly worse than non-merging banks, however, only in the year of the merger differences 
are  statistically  significant.  In  the  immediate  post-merger  years  merging  banks’  revenues 
grow in line with non-merging banks. However, in the third and fourth post-merger years 
merging banks outperform banks not involved in mergers in terms of revenue growth. Results 
suggest that, although merging banks experience an inferior performance immediately after 
the merger, they outperform non-merging banks in the long-run. Overall, our differences in 
means analysis suggests that negative merger related effects on merging banks’ revenues are 
only temporary in nature and that over time revenue synergies outweigh potential revenue 
dissynergies. 
For our regression analyses we make full use of our panel data set and apply fixed effects 
regression models in order to allow for unobserved time independent effects. We argue that it   18 
is reasonable to assume that unobserved characteristics that are individual for each bank in the 
sample influence the bank’s business and, thus, its individual ability to generate operating 
revenues.  Specifically,  we  use  the  so-called  fixed  effects  transformation  (or  within 
transformation)  that  uses  time-demeaned  dependent  and  independent  variables  in  order  to 
eliminate  the  unobserved  fixed  effect  in  a  first  step.  In  a  second  step  the  model  is  then 
estimated using pooled OLS regression.22 
Table 5 presents the effects of banks’ M&A activity on their net operating revenues. In Panel 
A  Ln(Net  Operating  Revenues)  is  regressed  on  our  M&A  activity  dummy  variables  and 
control  variables  for  bank  specific  characteristics,  market  concentration  and  the  local 
economic environment.23 24 In Panel B and C the same model setup is used in regressions 
with Net Operating Revenues per Employee and Net Operating Revenues as % of Total Assets 
as dependent variables, respectively. 
Across our three different measures of net operating revenues the immediate effects from 
mergers are negative and both economically and statistically significant. In the first years 
following a merger, banks experience a negative impact on net operating revenues of EUR 
3,000 to EUR 3,500 per employee. For the average merging savings bank with approximately 
820 employees this translates into a decrease in net operating revenues of EUR 2.5 to EUR 
2.9 million per year post-merger. This compares to an average operating income of EUR 39 
million  before  loan  loss  provisions  and  write-downs  or  EUR  16  million  after  loan  loss 
provisions and write-downs for merging banks in their pre-merger year, respectively. The 
significant negative merger related effects do not only persist in the year of the merger but 
also for the three years following the merger. In the fourth year following the merger net 
operating revenues remain negative, although only the results for Ln(Net Operating Revenues) 
and Net Operating Revenues per Employee remain statistically significant at the 10% and 5% 
levels, respectively. The magnitude of revenue dissynergies decreases over time.25 For Ln(Net 
                                                       
22  The fact that the sample of banks used in our analysis is not a random draw but represents all existing savings banks in 
Germany does not suggest the application of random effects regression (see Wooldridge (2002b)). 
23  We use logarithmic transformation for the absolute value of net operating revenues to achieve a normal distribution of the 
dependent variable as well as for interpretability purposes (see Wooldridge (2002a)). 
24  Please note that regression output for all regressions shown in Tables 5, 6 and 7 is based on observations only for the 
years 1999 to 2006 because five years of observations are dropped because of the inclusion of the dummy variables that 
account for banks’ merger involvement in at least the last five years. The step-wise inclusion of the M&A activity dummy 
variables and, hence, the step-wise shortening of the observation period leads to consistent results. 
25  The magnitude of the negative effects in the merger year is lower than in the year thereafter because mergers are effected 
throughout the year and not necessarily on January 1. Hence, negative effects included in the merger year on average do   19 
Operating Revenues) and Net Operating Revenues as % of Total Assets the magnitude of the 
negative  effects  from  M&A  starts  to  decrease  in  the  second  year  following  the  merger, 
compared to the fourth year for Net Operating Revenues per Employee. Based on these results 
we propose that some of the negative merger related effects are temporary in nature. For 
example, after the completion of the merger and the subsequent integration management is 
not any longer distracted and is able to refocus on the bank’s day-to-day business. Moreover, 
once  management  gains  experience  in  managing  the  enlarged  organization  the  negative 
effects from increased organizational complexity can be (partially) overcome. In the fifth year 
after  the  merger  and  the  years  thereafter,  mergers  even  have  a  positive  impact  on  net 
operating revenues, although only statistically significant at the 10% level for net operating 
revenues  per  employee.  Hence,  banks  seem  to  benefit  from  mergers  in  the  long-run 
suggesting that merger related gains, e.g. revenue synergies, require time to become visible as 
Amel et al. (2004) propose. The late emergence of merger gains is also the consequence of 
the negative effects offsetting the positive effects in the immediate post-merger period. 
For  savings  banks  which  generally  do  not  offer  much  potential  for  synergies  the  merger 
related effects on net operating revenues persist and are not offset by efficiency gains or other 
cost improvements and, hence, also have a negative “bottom-line” impact. Table 6 outlines 
the regression results for different measures of operating income before loan loss provisions, 
depreciation  and  amortization.  Other  profit  measures  lead  to  similar  results  but  are  not 
reported for reasons of brevity. For mergers among banks other than those observed in this 
study it remains to be shown whether negative effects on revenues can be offset by efficiency 
gains or cost cutting. Nevertheless, negative merger related effects on net operating revenues 
pose an alternative explanation for previous literature failing to provide consistent evidence 
for efficiency gains from M&A. 
In all regressions we control for bank specific characteristics, local market concentration and 
economic  factors.  Results  for  bank  size  (Ln(Total  Assets))  differ  across  measures  for  net 
operating revenues: Intuitively, Ln(Net Operating Revenues) increases with bank size (Table 
5, Panel A). Net Operating Revenues per Employee and Net Operating Revenues as % of 
Total Assets decrease with bank size (Table 5, Panel B and C). We explain the negative 
impact on these measures of net operating revenues with higher staffing requirements for back 
                                                                                                                                                                      
not account for a full year but rather a shorter period. In contrast, the negative effects in the first post-merger year and the 
years thereafter account for full year periods.   20 
office  and  administrative  functions  in  larger  banks.  Moreover,  increased  organizational 
complexity leads to the need for additional layers of management and potentially also results 
in  less  effective  management  and,  thus,  to  inferior  employee  productivity.  Net  operating 
revenues  decrease  with  increasing  Non-Interest  Revenues  /  Operating  Revenues  for  all 
measures  of  net  operating  revenues  as  dependent  variable.  We  propose  that  non-interest 
business is generally a higher margin business than the lending and deposit taking business. In 
order to grow profits banks need to generate fewer revenues from non-interest business than 
they  would  need  to  from  interest  business.  Furthermore,  interest  revenues  from  lending 
include  a  risk  component  that  is  usually  not  included  in  revenues  from  provision  or  fee 
revenues. Coefficients for Operating Expenses / Total Assets show positive signs for Ln(Net 
Operating Revenues) (Table 5, Panel A) and Net Operating Revenues as % of Total Assets 
(Table 5, Panel C) and are statistically significant. In line with Rhoades (1994) we explain 
this with different product mixes at individual banks. Some banks maintain extensive (costly) 
branch networks enabling them to access funding through deposits which is generally cheaper 
than money-market funding and, hence, increases net interest revenues. In contrast, banks 
with relatively smaller branch networks exhibit lower operating expenses but higher interest 
expenses due to relatively more expensive money market funding required in the absence of 
(sufficient)  deposits.  Alternatively,  the  more  banks  invest  in  personnel and  marketing  the 
more revenues they should be able to generate. In Panel B of Table 5 operating expenses 
show a negative sign because revenues per employee decrease with an increasing number of 
employees.26 In line with expectations, Loans / Total Assets show a positive sign because the 
return (interest income) on loans is higher than on any of the other earning assets of savings 
bank. We also include Loans / Total Assets as a proxy for the credit risk inherent in the bank’s 
business.  Since  banks  adjust  loan  interest  rates  for  credit  risk,  the  higher  the  credit  risk 
inherent in loans the higher the interest revenues. We explain the positive sign of Corporate 
Loans / Total Loans to Non-banks with considerably higher loan and non-interest business 
volumes  from  corporate  customers  compared  to  retail  customers.  The  negative  relation 
between operating revenues and the Equity / Total Assets suggests that a bank with more risk 
averse  management  takes  on  less  or  at  least  less  risky  business  which  is  line  with  our 
expectations. In our robustness tests we also control for total asset growth in order to account 
for the pace of banks’ growth, and the availability of deposits measured as percentage of total 
                                                       
26  Operating expenses are correlated with the number of employees because personnel expenses account for approximately 
60% of operating expenses.   21 
assets to control for changes in funding mix due to loss of deposits in the aftermath of branch 
network consolidation (see Rhoades (1994)). Both variables do not show significant results 
and, thus, are not reported.  
Our  regression  results  show  that  Local  HHI  has  a  positive  influence  on  net  operating 
revenues. In Germany, savings banks hold leading market positions in concentrated, typically 
rural, areas and often are one of just two banking groups present locally. Because savings 
banks  seem  to  be  able  to  extract  extra  returns  from  their  strong  position  in  concentrated 
markets, market concentration is positively related with net operating revenues.27 In terms of 
the macroeconomic environment, the Yield Curve Slope has a positive influence on revenues 
indicating  that  the  bank’s  ability  to  benefit  from  term  transformation  increases  with  an 
increasing  spread  between  short-term  and  long-term  interest  rates.  The  negative  sign  for 
Interest  Rate  is  contrary  to  our  expectations,  however,  we  propose  that  savings  banks 
developed strongly in the phase of declining interest rates, hence, we observe a negative sign. 
In our robustness checks we replace our market concentration measure and include GDP per 
inhabitant and the population density, both of which are highly correlated with our market 
concentration measure. Furthermore, we control for stock market performance which is highly 
correlated with our interest rate variable. All variables lead to consistent results but are not 
included in the regressions reported because of their correlation with other control variables.  
Generally, control variables are regularly statistically significant, their signs are as expected 
and the coefficients do not vary across different model specifications. 
The role of banks’ expertise from previous involvement in M&A 
In line with DeYoung (1993) we suggest that experience effects exist if banks are repeatedly 
engaged in mergers. Accordingly, in Table 7 we extend our analyses to investigate learning 
effects in M&As through banks’ previous involvement in M&A. For Net Operating Revenues 
per Employee we find a positive influence on revenues if the respective merging bank has 
previously been involved in at least one transaction during the observation period 1994 to 
2006.28 In terms of their statistical significance results become clearer if we exclude banks not 
                                                       
27  We do not separately investigate the impact from mergers on market concentration and respective banks’ market shares 
because German savings banks by law operate exclusively in non-overlapping business districts and therefore we expect 
mergers not to have significant effects on the competitive environment. 
28  For conciseness reasons we only report regression output for operating revenues per employee as dependent variable. 
However, alternative measures for net operating revenues lead to consistent results.   22 
involved in M&A during the observation period (Table 7, Panel B) and those that engaged in 
a merger only once (Table 7, Panel C) from the full sample (Table 7, Panel A). While in Panel 
A experience effects are significantly different from zero at the 10% level only in the merger 
year, Panel B and Panel C report significant experience effects for up to one and four post-
merger years, respectively. We argue that this is the case because of the only small number of 
banks (34) that are repeatedly involved in mergers compared to 423 banks that are involved in 
a maximum of one transaction. Results become more visible once the full sample is narrowed 
down, i.e. banks repeatedly involved in M&A are compared to a smaller control group. 
A  comparison  of  the  magnitude  of  negative  merger  related  effects  and  the  impact  of 
experience  suggests  that  banks  repeatedly  involved  in  M&A  are  able  to  avoid  merger 
dissynergies  to  a  large  extent.  However,  experienced  banks  are  not  able  to  fully  offset 
negative merger related effects. Furthermore, we observe that coefficient estimates for the 
M&A activity dummy variable increase in magnitude once we include the M&A expertise * 
M&A activity interaction term. This suggests that negative merger related effects at banks 
involved in M&A only once are economically even more pronounced than initially suggested. 
Generally,  coefficients  of  control  variables  show  results  that  are  consistent  in  terms  of 
direction, magnitude and significance with those from our initial model setup accounting for 
M&A activity only. 
Further robustness tests 
In order to highlight the robustness of our findings we apply our main regression analysis to a 
number of sub-samples of our data set. In a first test, we exclude all banks from our sample 
that are not involved in any M&A activity during the observation period. Thereby we show 
that negative effects on net operating revenues are not driven by the possibility that merging 
banks generally show an inferior performance compared to non-merging banks. In a second 
test, we exclude all banks with multiple M&A involvement during the observation period in 
order to avoid an overestimation of the revenue dissynergies through overlapping effects from 
different  mergers.  This  is  in  line  with  Rhoades  (1994)  who  argues  that  one  of  the 
shortcomings of earlier post-merger operating performance studies is that during the post-
merger period operating performance might not only be affected by the merger itself but also 
by other factors such as repeated mergers. Another reason why we exclude banks that are 
repeatedly engaged in M&A lays in the way we aggregate financials of merging banks in our   23 
data sample. The consolidation of financials of merging parties over the whole observation 
period, i.e. even in the years prior to the merger, results in merger related effects being diluted 
if a bank is involved in a subsequent merger, because at the time of the first merger the 
financials of banks actually integrated at a later stage have already been consolidated (see also 
Elsas (2004)). The robustness tests using sub-samples based on banks’ involvement in M&A 
are presented in Table 7 for Net Operating Revenues per Employee as dependent variable.29 
In another test, we review the definition of our M&A activity dummy variable that reflects 
whether a savings bank was involved in M&A in a respective year but does not account for 
the  number  of  transactions  in  any  one  year.  We  examine  the  post-merger  effects  on  net 
operating revenues for banks that merged with more than one other bank in any one year and 
find that those banks do not perform worse than those involved in one single merger in any 
one year. This is contrary to Srinivasan and Wall (1992) who show that mergers with more 
than two banks are more complex and costly mainly because the control of expenses becomes 
more  difficult  with  an  increasing  number  of  involved  parties  or  multiple  simultaneous 
transactions. In further tests we re-run our main regression using samples of different time 
horizons, bank size classes as well as East and West German savings banks separately and 
arrive at consistent results. 
In terms of the effects of bank size we also investigate whether merger related effects are 
dependent on the relative size differences between merging banks. Thereby we, first, define 
mergers in which the larger bank is not at least 25% larger than the smaller bank as mergers 
of equals. Furthermore, we include interaction terms between different acquirer and target 
size quartiles. In a final check we exclude all mergers in which one merger partner is smaller 
than 20% of the total assets of the largest participating bank. In all tests we arrive at results 
that are consistent with those presented above. 
According to Elsas (2004) and Koetter et al. (2005), a non-negligible share of mergers among 
savings banks and cooperative banks are motivated to pre-emptively resolve financial distress. 
In order to account for the possibility that our findings are driven by an inferior post-merger 
performance  of  mostly  distressed  banks  we  control  for  the  likelihood  of  a  merger  being 
motivated by imminent distress. Because we do not have information on the financial strength 
or the probability of distress of the banks participating in mergers on a pre-merger stand-alone 
                                                       
29  We do not report other robustness tests (e.g. those for our other two measures of net operating revenues as dependent 
variable) for conciseness reasons. However, results are available on request from the authors.   24 
basis we define a M&A activity and distress interaction term as the product of the M&A 
dummy  variable  and  the  relative  frequency  of  distress  cases  among  savings  banks  in  the 
respective year. Once we include the interaction term in our regression analysis coefficient 
estimates for the M&A activity indicate that negative merger related effects are generally only 
temporary and do not persist over time: For our measures Net Operating Revenues as % of 
Total Assets and Ln(Net Operating Revenues) dissynergies now only emerge in the merger 
year and the first post-merger year. The former measure for net operating revenues exhibits 
positive and significant merger related effects in the fourth and any subsequent post-merger 
year. Coefficient estimates for the M&A activity dummy variable in all other years are not 
significantly different from zero. For our interaction term between M&A activity  and the 
frequency of distress among savings banks coefficient estimates are negative and statistically 
significant also in the years two to four following the merger suggesting that indeed some of 
the  negative  merger  related  performance  can  be  explained  by  the  inclusion  of  distressed 
mergers  in  our  data  sample.  Only  for  Operating  Revenues  per  Employee  as  dependent 
variable  the  coefficient  estimates  for  the  interaction  term  are  positive  and  statistically 
significant which we explain with an accelerated reduction of the number of employees at the 
potentially  distressed  bank  following  the  merger.  Overall,  negative  merger  related  effects 
occur irrespective of the merger motive, however, negative effects are more likely to persist in 
the case of distress mergers. 
Finally, in order to account for the fact that merger related effects on banks’ net operating 
revenues are not realized instantaneously but over time we also conduct a dynamic analysis 
and  therefore  include  lags  of  the  dependent  variable  (see  Elsas  (2004)).  Because  in  this 
dynamic setting our initial fixed-effects regression model is biased we apply the dynamic 
panel data estimator using General Method of Moments (GMM) developed by Arellano and 
Bond (1991). Generally, results from the dynamic panel regression confirm negative merger 
related effects. Revenue dissynergies are statistically significant in the year of the merger and 
the first year thereafter, in the years two to four following the merger the coefficient estimates 
of  the  M&A  activity  dummy  variable  remain  negative,  however,  are  not  statistically 
significant. In the subsequent post-merger period the coefficient estimate is positive, but again 
not statistically significant.   25 
6.  Conclusion 
In this paper we present robust empirical evidence for revenue dissynergies as a consequence 
of mergers among savings banks in Germany. Negative merger related effects do not only 
emerge in the year of the merger or the first post-merger year but persist for up to four years 
following the merger. Furthermore, the effects are not offset by cost synergies or post-merger 
efficiency improvements and, hence, fully impact bank’s net operating income. Only after 
four years following the merger positive merger related effects become visible, suggesting 
either that revenue synergies take time to materialize or that dissynergies offset most of the 
synergistic effects in the immediate post-merger period.  
We  suggest  that  the  observed  revenue  dissynergies  from  bank  mergers  are  a  result  of 
increasing organizational complexity which makes it more difficult for senior management to 
effectively manage and control day-to-day operations. Furthermore, the merger process as 
well  as  the  post-merger  integration  may  temporarily  distract  managers  from  day-to-day 
operations reducing overall productivity and potentially leading to the loss of customers. Our 
robustness tests also suggest that some of the negative effects in the second, third and fourth 
year after the merger may be driven by mergers that were entered into as a preemptive move 
to resolve distress of one of the participating banks which poses a key motive for mergers 
among savings banks in Germany. Anecdotal evidence confirms both our finding of negative 
merger related effects as well as what we propose as the reasons for this inferior performance. 
Besides revenue dissynergies from mergers we also find positive learning effects from banks’ 
repeated  involvement  in  mergers.  M&A  experience  from  banks’  previous  involvement  in 
mergers  helps  these  banks  to  substantially  reduce  negative  merger  related  effects  on  net 
operating revenues in future deals. However, revenue dissynergies cannot fully be offset by 
experience. 
With  yet  another  study  proposing  (at  least  temporary)  negative  implications  from  bank 
mergers one might argue that mergers among banks are not performance enhancing at all. 
However, it needs to be highlighted that most performance studies fail to show true operating 
performance enhancements because actual synergies are difficult to measure and often require 
a number of years to be realized, a period in which other factors may substantially impact the 
bank’s  operating  performance.  Our  finding  of  negative  merger  related  effects  poses  an 
alternative cause why previous literature fails to find post-merger efficiency or profitability   26 
gains,  namely  potential  revenue  synergies  and  efficiency  improvements  might  be 
(temporarily)  offset  by  counteractive  revenue  dissynergies.  Furthermore,  Rhoades  (1994) 
suggests that the performance of one or both merger partners might have even deteriorated 
further  in  the  absence  of  the  merger.30  Negative  effects  from  M&A  may  also  signal  the 
importance of non-value maximizing motives for mergers such as regulatory requirements, 
political pressure or managerial hubris. Moreover, Berger et al. (1999) highlight that most 
studies  do  not  capture  any  positive  external  effects  from  mergers  such  as  efficiency 
improvements  that  banks  pass  on  to  their  customers  by  means  of  lower  prices  or  higher 
service levels. Due to the difficulties around measuring banks’ post-merger performance this 
subject remains an interesting topic for further research. For example, we suggest to extent 
our analysis of the post-merger performance of banks’ net operating revenues to banks other 
than  German  savings  banks  as  well  as  to  other  countries  in  order  to  ensure  that  revenue 
dissynergies  are  not  driven  by  factors  specific  to  German  savings  banks  or  the  German 
banking market in particular. 
                                                       
30  However, at the same time he admits that this argument might apply to a few mergers but that it provides a highly 
improbable explanation for the overall findings on post-merger operating performance studies.   27 
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Table 1: Description of variables 
Variable    Unit  Description 
   
Dependent variables   
Ln(Net Operating Revenues)  EUR 
million 
Natural logarithm of total operating revenues, i.e. net interest revenues plus non-interest revenues (i.e. 
fee, commission and other revenues) before deduction of any operating expenses. 




Total operating revenues divided by the average total number of employees. 
Calculation:  Operating revenues / employees 
Net Operating Revenues as % 
of Total Assets 
%  Total operating revenues divided by the bank’s average total assets. 
Calculation:  Operating revenues / total assets * 100 
   
Explanatory variables   
M&A related variables   
M&A activity  dummy 
variable 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the respective bank is involved in mergers and acquisitions in the respective 
year, otherwise 0. 
M&A expertise  dummy 
variable 
Dummy variable equal to 1 in all years following the respective bank’s first involvement in mergers and 
acquisitions, otherwise 0. 
   
Bank characteristics   
Ln(Total Assets)  EUR 
million 
Natural logarithm of bank’s average total assets. 
Non-Interest Revenues / 
Operating Revenues 
%  Percentage share of non-interest revenues of bank’s total operating revenues comprising of net interest 
revenues and non-interest revenues (i.e. fee, commission and other revenues) before deduction of any 
operating expenses. 
Calculation:  Non-interest revenues/ (net interest revenues + non-interest revenues) * 100 
Operating Expenses / Total 
Assets 
%  Percentage share of bank’s operating expenses (including both admin and personnel expenses) to bank’s 
average total assets. 
Calculation:  Operating expenses / total assets * 100 
Loans / Total Assets  %  Percentage share of bank’s average total loans to non-banks of bank’s average total assets. 
Calculation:  Loans / total assets * 100 
Corporate Loans / Total Loans 
to Non-banks 
%  Percentage share of bank’s average corporate loans to bank’s average total loans to non-banks. Corporate 
and total loans to non-banks include mortgages. 
Calculation:  Corporate loans / total loans to non-banks * 100 
Equity / Total Assets  %  Percentage share of average total shareholders’ equity of bank’s average total assets 
Calculation:  Equity / total assets * 100 
   
Market concentration 
Local HHI  %  Hirschmann-Herfindahl-Index of market shares used to estimate market concentration and competition. 
Since total assets for all German banks are not available on a district level, we approximate the market 






j) ms ( * 100;  
n=number of banks in local market, msj=market share (in terms of branches) of j
th bank 
   
Capital market rates   
Interest Rate  %  One-month interbank interest rate (EURIBOR) based on monthly averages. 
Yield Curve Slope  %  Difference in yields between short- (1-month) and long-term (10-year) maturities. 
Calculation:  10-year government bond rate – 1-month EURIBOR rate 
Note: Assets and liabilities represent average monthly balance sheet data for the respective year. Profit and loss items are as of the end of the respective 
year.   31 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics – Bank and market characteristics 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the sample of 457 public savings banks in Germany. Financials are pro forma adjusted for mergers by fully consolidating merging banks not only in the years following the merger but in 
all years of the observation period. Panel A presents totals for the savings banks sector as a whole and means of individual bank and market characteristics for each year for the period 1994 to 2006. Panel B presents the means and 
25% and 75% percentiles for each variable and for the full sample applied in our regression analyses for  the years 1999 to 2006 (observation period as per our regression analyses). Absolute values in EUR are presented at 2000 
prices to adjust for inflationary effects. The Compounded Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) is presented for the period 1994 to 2006. 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics by year (1994-2006)
Variables Unit 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 CAGR
Savings banks sector characteristics (sum)
Savings banks # 654 624 607 598 594 578 562 537 519 489 477 463 457 -2.9%
Total assets EUR billion 738 765 808 842 879 916 932 938 950 947 939 930 925 1.9%
Employees # 204,231 204,929 204,980 205,094 205,206 203,841 204,350 202,478 199,728 195,996 190,866 186,509 183,063 -0.9%
Branches # 18,851 18,599 18,323 18,036 17,753 17,438 16,867 16,135 15,386 14,448 14,270 13,958 13,766 -2.6%
Bank and market characteristics (mean)
Bank characteristics
Total Assets EUR million 1,614 1,674 1,768 1,843 1,923 2,003 2,038 2,052 2,079 2,073 2,055 2,035 2,025 1.9%
Net Operating Revenues EUR million 60 59 61 60 59 60 58 57 59 61 61 59 57 -0.3%
Net Operating Revenues per Employee EUR thousand 129 129 132 130 127 131 127 125 131 137 140 140 138 0.5%
Net Operating Revenues as % of Total Assets % 3.8% 3.6% 3.5% 3.3% 3.2% 3.1% 3.0% 2.9% 3.0% 3.1% 3.1% 3.0% 3.0% N/A
Non-Interest Revenues / Operating Revenues % 15.2% 15.0% 15.2% 16.0% 17.4% 18.9% 20.5% 19.4% 18.5% 19.3% 20.4% 20.8% 21.9% N/A
Operating Expenses / Total Assets % 2.2% 2.2% 2.2% 2.1% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 1.9% 1.9% N/A
Loans / Total Assets % N/A N/A 61% 62% 62% 61% 61% 62% 61% 61% 61% 60% 60% N/A
Corporate Loans / Total Loans to Non-banks % N/A N/A 46% 45% 46% 45% 45% 45% 44% 43% 43% 42% 42% N/A
Equity / Total Assets % N/A N/A 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 5% 5% 5% 5% N/A
Employees # 447 448 449 449 449 446 447 443 437 429 418 408 401 -0.9%
Local market concentration
Local HHI # N/A N/A 1,802 1,694 1,686 1,657 1,642 1,669 1,711 1,658 1,658 1,658 1,658 N/A
Capital market rates
Interest Rate % 5.4% 4.8% 3.4% 3.5% 3.8% 3.2% 4.7% 4.1% 3.5% 2.4% 2.3% 2.3% 3.4% N/A
Yield Curve Slope % N/A N/A 2.9% 2.5% 1.1% 1.6% 1.1% 0.4% 1.5% 1.7% 2.0% 1.2% 0.8% N/A
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for full sample (1999-2006)
Variables Unit 25% Mean 75%
Bank characteristics
Total Assets EUR million 684 2,045 2,365
Net Operating Revenues EUR million 22 59 71
Net Operating Revenues per Employee EUR thousand 121 134 145
Net Operating Revenues as % of Total Assets % 2.8% 3.0% 3.2%
Non-Interest Revenues / Operating Revenues % 17.9% 20.0% 21.9%
Operating Expenses / Total Assets % 1.8% 2.0% 2.2%
Loans / Total Assets % 55.1% 60.9% 68.8%
Corporate Loans / Total Loans to Non-banks % 39.0% 43.8% 48.8%
Equity / Total Assets % 3.9% 4.6% 5.1%
Employees # 165 429 527
Local market concentration
Local HHI # 1,264 1,664 2,016
Capital market rates
Interest Rate % 2.3% 3.2% 3.8%
Yield Curve Slope % 1.0% 1.3% 1.6%
Full sample (457 banks)
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics – M&A activity among German savings banks 
This table presents descriptive statistics of the merger activity of the 457 German public savings banks included in our sample for the years 1994 to 2006. Panel A presents the number of savings banks at the end of each year, the 
number of savings banks dissolved through M&A in each year and the number of savings banks involved in M&A in every year during the observation period. The latter is presented for the whole of Germany as well as for West 
and East Germany separately. The number of savings banks dissolved through M&A does not equal the M&A activity among savings banks because some M&A transactions involve more than two savings banks, also the number 
of M&A transactions of the individual bank in any one year is not taken into account. Panel B presents a breakdown of the number of saving banks involved in M&A by the frequency of their involvement. The sum of savings 
banks involved in M&A in each year during the observation period is 206 which is greater than the total number of savings banks involved in M&A during the observation period of 157 due to repeated M&A activity by 34 of the 
157 merging savings banks. Repeated M&A involvement is used as proxy for M&A expertise in our regression analyses. Our M&A expertise dummy has the value 1 in all years following the first M&A involvement of the 
respective savings bank, and 0 otherwise. 
Panel A: Development of number of savings banks and M&A activity among savings banks
Total 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Savings banks N/A 654 624 607 598 594 578 562 537 519 489 477 463 457
Savings banks dissolved through M&A 246 49 30 17 9 4 16 16 25 18 30 12 14 6
M&A activity per year 206 36 23 13 8 4 12 14 21 17 27 11 14 6
M&A activity per year - West Germany 136 12 1 6 6 4 10 14 21 17 23 6 10 6
M&A activity per year - East Germany 70 24 22 7 2 0 2 0 0 0 4 5 4 0
Panel B: Number of savings banks involved in M&A by activity
Total
Savings banks involved in M&A in at least 1 year 157
Savings banks not involved in M&A during observation period 300
Savings banks involved in M&A in 1 year 123
Savings banks involved in M&A in more than 1 year 34
Savings banks involved in M&A in 2 years 26
Savings banks involved in M&A in 3 years 3
Savings banks involved in M&A in 4 years 4
Savings banks involved in M&A in 5 years 0
Savings banks involved in M&A in 6 years 1
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Table 4: Differences in means – Post-merger performance of German savings banks 
This table presents results for t-tests of differences in means for the simultaneous development of Net Operating Revenues, Net Operating Revenues as % 
of Total Assets and Net Operating Revenues per Employee of merging banks and 300 savings banks not involved in mergers during the observation 
period from 1994 and 2006. We do not include all 123 savings banks involved in M&A once during the observation period to ensure a balanced sample 
for each post-merger year observed. Savings banks repeatedly involved in M&A are not included in order to avoid interfering effects from repeated M&A 
in the post-merger period of the first merger. We also use an index with the year prior to the merger (t = -1) as base year to ensure that savings banks of 
different sizes are equally weighted. Performance is reported for the merger year (t = 0) and the respective years following the merger (t = +1, t = +2, t = 
+3, t = +4). 
Variables t = -1 t = 0 t = +1 t = +2 t = +3 t = +4
Net Operating Revenues
Merging banks 100 100 102 104 107 108
Non-merging banks (control group) 100 102 104 106 107 109
Difference 0 -2*** -2*** -3*** -1 -1
Net Operating Revenues as % of Total Assets
Merging banks 100 99 99 99 96 95
Non-merging banks (control group) 100 100 99 98 94 91
Difference 0 -1** 0  1  2  4**
Net Operating Revenues per Employee
Merging banks 100 101 105 107 112 115
Non-merging banks (control group) 100 103 106 109 110 111
Difference 0 -2* -1  -1  2* 4***
***significant at 0 to 1 percent level, **significant at 1 to 5 percent level, *significant at 5 to 10 percent level, others: significant at above 10 percent level
Post-merger performance
(index based on pre-merger year (t = -1); merger in t = 0)
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Table 5: The effects of bank M&A activity on banks’ net operating revenues 
This table presents coefficient estimates from regressions relating M&A activity to banks’ net operating revenues (i.e. net interest revenues plus net non-
interest revenues before deduction of any operating expenses). Dependent variables are Ln(Net Operating Revenues) (Panel A), Net Operating Revenues 
per Employee (Panel B) and Net Operating Revenues as % of Total Assets (Panel C). All regressions are applied to the full sample comprising all 457 
savings banks in our dataset. Regression analyses include observations for the years 1999 to 2006, observations for the years 1994 to 1998 are excluded 
because five years of observations are dropped due to the inclusion of five lags of the M&A activity dummy variable. All regressions include year dummy 
variables (not reported). As estimation technique, we use fixed effects regression models with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. P-values are 










as % of Total Assets
M&A activity
M&A activity (τ = t) -0.025*** -3.028*** -0.070***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
M&A activity (τ = t - 1) -0.027*** -3.451*** -0.074***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
M&A activity (τ = t - 2) -0.020*** -3.133*** -0.056***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
M&A activity (τ = t - 3) -0.019*** -3.431*** -0.053***
[0.000] [0.001] [0.000]
M&A activity (τ = t - 4) -0.009* -2.495** -0.021
[0.074] [0.016] [0.164]
M&A activity (τ < t - 4) 0.003 2.152* 0.012
[0.588] [0.050] [0.434]
Bank characteristics
Ln(Total Assets) 0.572*** -5.773 -1.188***
[0.000] [0.273] [0.000]
Non-Interest Revenues / Operating Revenues -0.012*** -1.032*** -0.034***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Operating Expenses / Total Assets 0.122*** -23.300*** 0.381***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Loans / Total Assets 0.002*** 0.189** 0.006***
[0.000] [0.012] [0.000]
Corporate Loans / Total Loans to Non-banks 0.001*** 0.022 0.003***
[0.005] [0.714] [0.005]
Equity / Total Assets -0.007*** -1.514*** -0.023***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.000]
Local market concentration
Local HHI 0.000** 0.004** 0.000**
[0.030] [0.019] [0.042]
Capital market rates
Interest Rate -0.011*** -6.015*** -0.030***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Yield Curve Slope 0.052*** 6.587*** 0.157***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 3,651 3,651 3,651
Number of banks 457 457 457
R-squared within 0.666 0.650 0.491
R-squared between 0.989 0.110 0.193
R-squared overall 0.986 0.288 0.175
***significant at 0 to 1 percent level, **significant at 1 to 5 percent level, *significant at 5 to 10 percent level, others: significant at above 10 percent level   35 
Table 6: The effects of bank M&A activity on banks’ operating income 
This table presents coefficient estimates from regressions relating M&A activity to banks’ operating income before loan loss provisions, depreciation and 
amortization. Dependent variables are Ln(Operating Income) (Panel A), Operating Income per Employee (Panel B) and Operating Income as % of Total 
Assets (Panel C). All regressions are applied to the full sample comprising all 457 savings banks in our dataset. Regression analyses include observations 
for the years 1999 to 2006, observations for the years 1994 to 1998 are excluded because five years of observations are dropped due to the inclusion of 
five lags of the M&A activity dummy variable. All regressions include year dummy variables (not reported). As estimation technique, we use fixed 





Operating Income per 
Employee
Panel C:
Operating Income as % of 
Total Assets
M&A activity
M&A activity (τ = t) -0.089*** -3.438*** -0.071***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
M&A activity (τ = t - 1) -0.094*** -3.593*** -0.075***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
M&A activity (τ = t - 2) -0.056*** -2.724*** -0.053***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
M&A activity (τ = t - 3) -0.056*** -2.920*** -0.055***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
M&A activity (τ = t - 4) -0.024 -1.826** -0.025
[0.182] [0.020] [0.108]
M&A activity (τ < t - 4) 0.018 1.532* 0.015
[0.335] [0.064] [0.352]
Bank characteristics
Ln(Total Assets) -0.348*** -30.552*** -1.198***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Non-Interest Revenues / Operating Revenues -0.040*** -1.386*** -0.034***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Operating Expenses / Total Assets -0.645*** -39.685*** -0.593***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Loans / Total Assets 0.007*** 0.246*** 0.006***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Corporate Loans / Total Loans to Non-banks 0.003** 0.101** 0.003***
[0.018] [0.038] [0.002]
Equity / Total Assets -0.035*** -0.730** -0.023***
[0.000] [0.047] [0.001]
Local market concentration
Local HHI 0.000 0.004*** 0.000*
[0.107] [0.003] [0.051]
Capital market rates
Interest Rate -0.026*** -2.427*** -0.021***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Yield Curve Slope 0.187*** 7.811*** 0.176***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 3,651 3,651 3,651
Number of banks 457 457 457
R-squared within 0.511 0.597 0.473
R-squared between 0.523 0.026 0.049
R-squared overall 0.385 0.055 0.047
***significant at 0 to 1 percent level, **significant at 1 to 5 percent level, *significant at 5 to 10 percent level, others: significant at above 10 percent level 
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Table 7: The effects of bank M&A activity on banks’ net operating revenues – accounting for 
prior M&A expertise 
This table presents coefficient estimates from regressions relating M&A activity to banks’ net operating revenues (i.e. net interest revenues plus net non-
interest revenues before deduction of any operating expenses). Dependent variable is Net Operating Revenues per Employee. Panel A presents regressions 
including all banks (“Full sample”). Panel B presents regressions including banks with at least one M&A involvement (“Banks with M&A involvement 
only”). Panel C presents regressions including only banks with more than one M&A involvement. Columns (1) present coefficient estimates from 
regressions relating M&A activity to banks’ operating revenues that do not account for prior M&A expertise of banks, whereas Columns (2) present 
coefficient estimates from regression relating M&A activity to banks’ operating revenues that account for prior M&A expertise of merging banks. All 
regressions include year dummy variables (not reported). As estimation technique, we use fixed effects regression models with heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors. P-values are reported in brackets. 
Variables (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
M&A activity
M&A activity (τ = t) -3.028*** -4.004*** -3.925*** -5.799*** -2.072 -8.982***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.114] [0.004]
M&A activity (τ = t - 1) -3.451*** -4.135*** -4.816*** -6.480*** -2.337* -9.485***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.072] [0.006]
M&A activity (τ = t - 2) -3.133*** -3.338*** -4.861*** -6.230*** -3.966*** -9.960***
[0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.002] [0.001]
M&A activity (τ = t - 3) -3.431*** -3.530*** -5.382*** -6.920*** -5.097*** -11.935***
[0.001] [0.002] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
M&A activity (τ = t - 4) -2.495** -2.295* -4.469*** -6.203*** -4.934*** -13.545***
[0.016] [0.071] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000]
M&A activity (τ < t - 4) 2.152* 2.051 -1.760 -3.912** -4.206** -12.811***
[0.050] [0.120] [0.220] [0.041] [0.011] [0.000]
M&A expertise * M&A activity
M&A expertise * M&A activity  (τ = t) 3.125* 4.655** 8.213**
[0.085] [0.011] [0.016]
M&A expertise * M&A activity (τ = t - 1) 1.742 3.219* 8.230**
[0.365] [0.083] [0.033]
M&A expertise * M&A activity (τ = t - 2) 0.090 2.028 6.507*
[0.963] [0.299] [0.056]
M&A expertise * M&A activity (τ = t - 3) -0.082 2.424 8.009**
[0.969] [0.259] [0.020]
M&A expertise * M&A activity (τ = t - 4) -1.529 2.623 10.558***
[0.492] [0.271] [0.003]
Bank characteristics
Ln(Total Assets) -5.773 -5.465 -13.873 -13.624 26.607 27.079*
[0.273] [0.296] [0.292] [0.295] [0.113] [0.095]
Non-Interest Revenues / Operating Revenues -1.032*** -1.033*** -0.783*** -0.816*** -1.083** -0.957*
[0.000] [0.000] [0.009] [0.006] [0.033] [0.072]
Operating Expenses / Total Assets -23.300*** -23.160*** -23.904*** -22.974*** -19.275** -17.047**
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.012] [0.024]
Loans / Total Assets 0.189** 0.188** 0.045 0.046 -0.355 -0.381*
[0.012] [0.012] [0.801] [0.795] [0.104] [0.061]
Corporate Loans / Total Loans to Non-banks 0.022 0.019 -0.159 -0.167 -0.061 -0.091
[0.714] [0.756] [0.199] [0.176] [0.756] [0.640]
Equity / Total Assets -1.514*** -1.496*** 0.812 0.719 2.122 2.028
[0.001] [0.001] [0.421] [0.475] [0.175] [0.186]
Local market concentration
Local HHI 0.004** 0.004** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.000 -0.001
[0.019] [0.021] [0.002] [0.002] [0.947] [0.874]
Capital market rates
Interest Rate -6.015*** -5.991*** -6.661*** -6.846*** -5.356*** -5.825***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Yield Curve Slope 6.587*** 6.591*** 6.284*** 6.329*** 6.719*** 6.602***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 3,651 3,651 1,255 1,255 272 272
Number of banks 457 457 157 157 34 34
R-squared within 0.650 0.651 0.641 0.643 0.724 0.737
R-squared between 0.110 0.119 0.060 0.054 0.559 0.539
R-squared overall 0.288 0.297 0.036 0.042 0.557 0.543








multiple M&A involvement only
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